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ABSTRACT
Across the spectrum of ideas debated within the law of democracy, the
view is nearly unanimous that the Justices must lead the way toward a better
democracy. And yet, as we argue in this Essay, the Court’s handling of the
problems since its initial intervention in Baker v. Carr has been nothing
short of a mess. Debates in this area offer modern instances of a Court that
cares little about doctrinal consistency and judicial craftsmanship, of Justic* Louis F. Neizer Faculty Fellow and Professor of Law, Indiana University Maurer School of Law—Bloomington. B.A., 1990, J.D., 1997, Ph.D., Political Science, 2001,
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es that care less about compromise and common ground and more about
expressing their deeply held views about politics, democracy, and the law.
In response, we look back to the debate between Justices Brennan and
Frankfurter over the wisdom of judicial intervention. And to our minds, this
is a debate with a clear winner: to this day, Justice Frankfurter’s forceful
argument has gone both unheeded and unanswered. The evidence is in, and
so, after forty years of judicial review in the realm of politics, the question
for the future should be whether judicial intervention in the realm of politics
is worth the cost.
“This Court seems incapable of admitting that some matters—any matters—
are none of its business.”1
INTRODUCTION
“If democracy consisted only in the desire of people to express what is
on their minds and the willingness of their leaders to respond to those desires,” writes Alan Wolfe, “American democracy today would be a cause
for celebration.”2 Yet democracy is far more complicated than that, and
Wolfe makes clear that the quality of democracy, as practiced in the United
States, is seriously wanting.3 The data is plentiful. At the micro-level, citizens are apathetic and disengaged and voters know very little about politics.
At the macro-level, accountability from elected officials is lacking, mediating institutions such as political parties and interest groups are viewed with
distrust, and neutral bodies such as the media and administrative agencies
are no longer driven by the public good but in accordance with the preferences of the party in power.4
The fashionable way out of this condition—arguably the only way—
points to the U.S. Supreme Court. Across the spectrum of ideas debated
within the law of democracy, the view is nearly unanimous that the Justices
must lead the way toward a better democracy. Consider in this vein the
debate at the heart of the law of democracy, between advocates of judicial
intervention in defense of individual rights (the “individualists”) and those
who advocate for judicial intervention as a corrective measure for structural
flaws (the “structuralists”). Both sides find common ground in their view
that the Court must play an important role in this area. Curiously, they also
agree that the opposing camp is misguided and ultimately expects too much
from the Court. According to Rick Hasen, a leading individualist, the structuralists “evince judicial hubris, a belief that judges appropriately should be
1. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 750 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment).
2. ALAN WOLFE, DOES AMERICAN DEMOCRACY STILL WORK? 12 (2006).
3. See id. at 14.
4. See id.

Summer]

Leaving the Thicket at Last?

419

cast in the role of supreme political regulators.”5 In contrast, Rick Pildes, a
leading structuralist, worries that a turn to rights in this area might “Lochnerize the very design of democratic institutions.”6 Both camps thus aim to
provide a space for the Court to intervene in politics, while simultaneously
minimizing its effects.
These are legitimate concerns. Take any issue, from partisan gerrymandering and minority vote dilution to campaign finance or the Voting
Rights Act. Each of these debates offers modern instances of a Court that
cares little about doctrinal consistency, judicial craftsmanship, and compromise or common ground. Instead, the Justices seem to care more about
expressing their deeply held views about politics, democracy, and the law.
The opinions in these cases are so confused and confusing that scholars can
hardly make sense of them; or, as Heather Gerken explained in the wake of
LULAC,7 the Texas gerrymandering case, “The authors’ interpretations of
LULAC are so different that at times one wonders whether they were reading the same opinion.”8 But do not take our word for it. According to Pam
Karlan:
Sixty years after Justice Frankfurter warned his colleagues “not to enter this political thicket,” the Court is embroiled in the thicket more than ever. Part of the reasons for the current inconsistency in the doctrine are the very real tensions that any
jurisprudence of politics must navigate: among stability, robust competition, and
protection of minority groups; between protecting individual rights and promoting
institutional arrangements that fairly reflect group interests; and between antientrenchment and anti-discrimination models of judicial intervention. As long as
money and race remain salient in American politics—and it’s hard to imagine either fading away any time soon—judicial intervention will remain both necessary,
and necessarily dicey.9

Unquestionably, the law of democracy is messy and contested. A
much better question is whether this is an inevitable consequence of judicial
review in this volatile area, or whether the Court is up to something else. Is
the cure worse than the disease itself? Or, is judicial intervention, no matter
how divided and inconsistent, a necessary component of American-style
democracy?
One answer suggests that all these questions—and the Court’s apparent incoherence—can be summarily explained as an institutional strategy to

5. RICHARD L. HASEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND ELECTION LAW: JUDGING
EQUALITY FROM BAKER V. CARR TO BUSH V. GORE 13 (2003).
6. Richard H. Pildes, The Supreme Court, 2003 Term – Foreword: The Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 28, 48 (2004).
7. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006).
8. Heather K. Gerken, Rashomon and the Roberts Court, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1213,
1214 (2007) [hereinafter Gerken, Rashomon].
9. Pamela S. Karlan, New Beginnings and Dead Ends in the Law of Democracy, 68
OHIO ST. L.J. 743, 766 (2007).
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hold the doctrine in place until the Court finds a coherent way out of the
muddle. As elegantly and forcefully argued by Professor Gerken, the Court
is in a holding pattern—essentially “treading water” before a new coalition
emerges to infuse a much needed coherence into the law of democracy.10
She labels the current state of the law “a doctrinal interregnum” and explains it as follows: “The Court seems to sense the imminence of a paradigm shift, but it is not sure where the next analytic road will lead. It is thus
content with going through the motions, patching the holes in the existing
foundation, holding the doctrinal edifice together a little while longer.”11
Aware that its existing paradigm is no longer useful and has reached “an
intellectual dead end,”12 the Court is “staying put” while it waits for a cohesive majority to emerge.
This is an intriguing account of the present state of the law of democracy. And who knows, it may well be the case that this doctrinal incoherence is part of a larger strategy on the part of the Court. To our minds,
however, the law of democracy and the Court’s role in shaping it have
changed very little from the moment the Court began to regulate these questions in Baker v. Carr.13 What we see today is not very different from what
we saw thirty years ago. Consider, for example, Justice Harlan’s words in
his separate opinion in Whitcomb v. Chavis, decided in 1971:
The suggestion implicit in the Court’s opinion that [plaintiffs] may ultimately prevail if they can make their record in these and other like respects should be recognized for what it is: a manifestation of frustration by a Court that has become
trapped in the “political thicket” and is looking for the way out.
This case is nothing short of a complete vindication of Mr. Justice Frankfurter’s
warning nine years ago “of the mathematical quagmire (apart from divers judicially inappropriate and elusive determinants) into which this Court today catapults the
lower courts of the country.” With all respect, it also bears witness to the morass
into which the Court has gotten itself by departing from sound constitutional principle in the electoral field.14

As the Court continues to struggle with its handling of questions of
democracy, we ask the one question missing from modern debates about the
Court and its role in regulating our politics: is it time to reconsider the
Court’s return to the political question regime of old, where the Court
10. Gerken, Rashomon, supra note 8, at 1213 (noting that the “doctrinal interregnum
continues” with the Roberts Court); see Heather K. Gerken, Lost in the Political Thicket: The
Court, Election Law, and the Doctrinal Interregnum, 153 PA. L. REV. 503, 504, 515-16
(2004) [hereinafter Gerken, Lost] (noting that the Court is “in a doctrinal holding pattern,
unsure of where to go next”).
11. Gerken, Lost, supra note 10, at 516-17.
12. Id. at 505.
13. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
14. 403 U.S. 124, 170 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186, 268 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)) (internal citation omitted).
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played no role in reigning in the excesses of politics? As the leading camps
within the law of democracy jostle for supremacy while simultaneously
deriding their critics as advocates of judicial activism, it might be well
worth remembering that a third option once existed. Even if one is ambivalent—as we are—about returning the Court to the world pre-1961, it might
be time to at least consider a third option.
This Essay develops this argument in the course of three Parts. Part I
sketches the modern debate over the role of the Court in our constitutional
universe. One model focuses on the question of who should have the ultimate authority to interpret the Constitution. The claim here, as recently
examined by Larry Kramer, argues that the Rehnquist Court embraced the
notion of judicial supremacy. This is a view of the Court as aggressive,
muscular, and supreme. A second model looks to the question of when the
Court should intervene in difficult social and political controversies. The
argument here is based on Alexander Bickel’s notion of the “passive virtues,” and presents a view of the Court as prudential, pragmatic, and attuned
to social and political realities. Finally, a third model largely focuses on
how the Court should decide cases once it accepts them for review. This
model is associated with Cass Sunstein’s concept of “judicial minimalism.”
A minimalist court must issue narrow and shallow opinions in order to allow the disagreeing parties enough room for reaching consensus.
Part II argues that the Court’s modern performance is in line with its
traditional behavior in the field. There is nothing new here. This Part uses
the short history of the minority vote dilution cases as a case study. We
choose this area of the law for an important reason. As the Supreme Court
continues to demonstrate deep ambivalence about the constitutionality of
the Voting Rights Act, there may come a time in the near future when these
cases will once again return to prominence. Our discussion highlights their
importance in the development of the law while foreshadowing their likely
resurgence.
Finally, Part III asks the obvious question: is the Court’s intervention
in our politics worth the cost? Or is it time to advocate for the Court’s exit
from the famed political thicket? In 1961, Justices Brennan and Frankfurter
could only debate hypothetically the issues at the heart of the Court’s choice
to enter the field of politics. Close to half a century later, and evidence in
hand, we look back to that important debate. Again, while it is clear to us
that Justice Frankfurter has won the argument by a wide margin, we do not
think that the Court must overturn Baker v. Carr. But at the very least, we
must take the argument seriously. The Court’s incoherent regulation of our
democracy demands no less.
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I. THREE FACES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW: A CONTINUUM
An institution faced with a difficult question may first choose to act;
or, instead, it may choose to do nothing. Once it chooses to act, it may
choose to do so assertively or cautiously, depending upon the circumstances
in question. These choices may be set as part of a continuum, with action
and inaction being polar extremes.
Accounts of the judicial function may be set along a similar continuum. This Part briefly catalogues three leading accounts, as initially developed by prominent constitutional theorists in the prestigious Supreme
Court Forewords to the Harvard Law Review.15 One end finds a strong version of judicial supremacy, of a Court that acts with much confidence, perhaps hubris. Many scholars posit the Court precisely here, willing and able
to aggrandize its own power vis-à-vis the political branches.16 Strands of
this argument place the demise of the political questions doctrine at the
heart of the Court’s newfound posture, though its reach is seen across myriad doctrinal arenas. The opposite end finds calls for judicial inaction
grounded in prudence and the “passive virtues.”
Recent calls for a jurisprudence of “judicial minimalism” fall between
these two extremes.17 This is a view of the Court as restrained, its rulings
narrow and shallow, going no farther than necessary. In particular, some
influential accounts posit the Rehnquist Court circa 2004 as a minimalist
Court.18

15. See Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court, 2000 Term – Foreword: We the
Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2001); Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court 1995, Term –
Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1996) [hereinafter Sunstein,
Leaving Things]; Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court 1960 Term – Foreword: The
Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1961).
16. See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 15; Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme Than
Court? The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102
COLUM. L. REV. 237 (2002).
17. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Smallest Court in the Land, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2004,
at WK9 [hereinafter Sunstein, Smallest Court]. See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE
AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT (1999) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, ONE
CASE]. This characterization intends to encompass both Sunstein’s position and that of the
“original minimalist manifesto.” Christopher J. Peters, Assessing the New Judicial Minimalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1454, 1457 (2000). See Mark Tushnet, Law and Prudence in the
Law of Justiciability: The Transformation and Disappearance of the Political Question Doctrine, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1203, 1233 (2002) (labeling Sunstein “Bickel’s jurisprudential heir”).
Peters includes Michael Dorf, Richard Fallon, Robert Burt, Neal Katyal, and Neal Devins
within the “minimalist” school. See Peters, supra, at 1466-74. Dorf, for one, disputes the
characterization. See Michael C. Dorf, Legal Indeterminacy and Institutional Design, 78
N.Y.U. L. REV. 875, 887 n.36 (2003).
18. See Sunstein, Leaving Things, supra note 15, at 6; cf. Bickel, supra note 15, at
40, 51 (“It happens that a number of this Term’s most celebrated cases were as significant for
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A. Judicial Hubris: A “Muscular” Supremacy, Turning to Sovereignty
In his recent Harvard Law Review Foreword, Larry Kramer placed the
notion of judicial supremacy at the heart of his contribution. His thesis examined the widespread acceptance of judicial supremacy by all relevant
political and constitutional actors.19 As he wrote, “in the years since Cooper
v. Aaron, the idea of judicial supremacy—the notion that judges have the
last word when it comes to constitutional interpretation and that their decisions determine the meaning of the Constitution for everyone—has finally
found widespread approbation.”20 Even among scholars who criticize and
disapprove of this role, Kramer concluded, “the Court remains the preeminent institution in establishing constitutional meaning.”21
The argument here is that the Rehnquist Court anointed itself as preeminent constitutional interpreter, the last word on matters of constitutional
interpretation.22 The quintessential buck stops right at the steps of the Supreme Court building. All other relevant actors, from the President to Congress to the states, must play a secondary role.23
Placed in historical context, this argument often begins with Chief Justice Marshall’s claim in Marbury that it is “emphatically the province and
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”24 It also includes
Cooper’s axiom that the Court is “supreme in the exposition of the law of
the Constitution.”25 Modern examples of this position are many, and Kramer offers his share. The obvious ones are City of Boerne v. Flores,26 where
the Court rejected congressional attempts to overrule a recent Court deci-

having brought into focus the uses and nonuses of techniques of withholding ultimate constitutional adjudication, as for having wrought changes in substantive law.”).
19. Kramer, supra, note 15. Kramer is not alone in making this observation, as
noted above. See, e.g., MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE
COURTS (1999); L.A. Powe, Jr., The Politics of American Judicial Review: Reflections on the
Marshall, Warren, and Rehnquist Courts, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 697 (2003).
20. Kramer, supra note 15, at 6.
21. Id. at 8.
22. See also Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal
Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441 (2000).
23. This Part implies neither agreement with nor universal acceptance of Kramer’s
claims. As to the latter, scholars have obviously challenged some of the views described
here. See, e.g., Dale Carpenter, Judicial Supremacy and Its Discontents, 20 CONST.
COMMENT. 405 (2003); Marci A. Hamilton, Nine Shibboleths of the New Federalism, 47
WAYNE L. REV. 931 (2001).
24. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
25. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958).
26. 521 U.S. 507 (1997); see also Michael W. McConnell, Comment, Institutions
and Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV. 153, 163
(1997) (contending that the Court in Boerne “adopted the most judge-centered view of constitutional law since Cooper v. Aaron”).
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sion under its Section 5 power; United States v. Lopez,27 where the Court
struck down a congressional enactment on Commerce Clause grounds;28 the
various Commerce Clause cases of the 1990s, which, Kramer argues, essentially foreclose the judgment of Congress in this area;29 and the mother of all
judicial supremacy cases, Bush v. Gore.30
Kramer offers brief, yet choice words for Bush. Readers likely recall
the Court’s seemingly apologetic words about intervening in the election:
None are more conscious of the vital limits on judicial authority than are the
Members of this Court, and none stand more in admiration of the Constitution’s
design to leave the selection of the President to the people, through their legislatures, and to the political sphere. When contending parties invoke the process of
the courts, however, it becomes our unsought responsibility to resolve the federal
and constitutional issues the judicial system has been forced to confront.31

Kramer has very little patience for this passage: “These sentiments,
coming as they do immediately after the Court’s brute exercise of authority
to halt the recount, have a ‘they doth protest too much, methinks’ quality
about them. Unsought responsibility?! Forced to confront?!”32 The initial
question was one of institutional responsibility, of locating the proper forum
to decide this electoral question. To Kramer, the answer was simple:
“Nothing kept the Justices from ruling that the Supreme Court was not the
proper forum in which to decide a presidential election. Nothing in the law,
that is.”33
Under procedures and doctrines then in effect, and once it decided to
see the case to its conclusion, the Court had two options at its disposal. On
the question of Florida law, the Court should have returned the case to the
Florida Supreme Court. But the Court had no intention of doing any such
thing. “Having determined to prevent [returning the case to the Florida Supreme Court] at all costs, the Justices in the majority had no choice but to
lie, fabricating a transparently phony claim to be following the lead of the
Florida Supreme Court.”34 Ultimately, a second option might have included
27. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
28. See J. Peter Mulhern, In Defense of the Political Question Doctrine, 137 U. PA.
L. REV. 97, 151 & n.193 (1988) (observing that the Court consistently—absent one case,
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976)—deferred to Congress under the
Commerce Clause from 1937 to 1995).
29. See Kramer, supra note 15, at 145.
30. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
31. Id. at 111.
32. Kramer, supra note 15, at 156.
33. Id.; see also HASEN, supra note 5, at 9 (“The lament was disingenuous because
the Court could have declined to hear the case not once but twice.”); Powe, supra note 19, at
731 (“The responsibility, far from being unsought, was one the justices had been demanding
for a decade by their imperialism in displacing and disparaging other constitutional interpreters.”).
34. Kramer, supra note 15, at 155-56.
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a larger role for Congress.35 Yet, Kramer writes, “[n]othing jumps off the
pages of the opinion quite so starkly as the majority’s evident determination
to call a halt to things before Congress could get its hands on the problem.”36
After Bush v. Gore, scholars contend that very little remains of the political question doctrine. Or so it appears. If the facts in this case do not
warrant that the Court step aside, it is hard to see what facts might so warrant. This is another way of saying that a tension exists between the political question doctrine, which demands judicial humility and passivity, and
the Court’s modern view of its power and its place in our constitutional
world as supreme interpreter. These two positions cannot co-exist. And
according to some commentators, they no longer do. “It is hardly surprising,” Rachel Barkow writes, “that the Court has opted for the course that
aggrandizes its own power.”37 Kramer poses a similar issue in closing his
provocative Article: “The Supreme Court has made its grab for power. The
question is: will we let them get away with it?”38
In sum, this judicial posture is strong, muscular, and supreme. It is the
posture of a Court not worried about minor details, but committed to asserting its authority across spheres and boundaries. It is the posture of a confident Court, sure of its place in the constitutional cosmos and unafraid to flex
its considerable muscle. This posture, according to Kramer, is far more than
judicial supremacy; it is “judicial sovereignty.”39

B. Judicial Humility: Of Prudence, the “Passive Virtues” and Political
Questions
But the Court was not always so confident and assertive. Writing in
the wake of the Warren Court’s Brown revolution, and during a lull prior to
the judicial tempest of the mid-1960s, Alexander Bickel’s own Foreword
tells a story far different from Kramer’s account. In fairness, his concerns
35. See Guido Calabresi, In Partial (but not Partisan) Praise of Principle, in BUSH V.
GORE: THE QUESTION OF LEGITIMACY 67, 68 (Bruce Ackerman ed., 2002) (contending that
one approach to Bush v. Gore would have been to “[l]et the House and Senate do their job”);
Elizabeth Garrett, Leaving the Decision to Congress, in THE VOTE: BUSH, GORE, AND THE
SUPREME COURT 38, 48-54 (Cass R. Sunstein & Richard A. Epstein eds., 2001); Laurence H.
Tribe, Comment, EROG v. HSUB and its Disguises: Freeing Bush v. Gore from Its Hall of
Mirrors, 115 HARV. L. REV. 170, 277-78 (2001) (“There is a powerful case indeed for the
Court playing no role other than to protect Congress’s decisionmaking function—that is, for
treating the matter as a political question textually committed to Congress under the Twelfth
Amendment, rather than a legal question properly resolved by a court. The requisite textual
commitment to a political branch could hardly be clearer.”).
36. Kramer, supra note 15, at 154.
37. Barkow, supra note 16, at 242.
38. Kramer, supra note 15, at 169.
39. Id. at 158.
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were unlike those faced by constitutional theorists today. Bickel had seen
Brown first-hand and had played a direct role in its outcome. He also witnessed the Southern response and the Court’s own rejoinder in Cooper v.
Aaron.40 These experiences raised a different set of concerns for Bickel.
Rather than worry about the Court’s undemocratic pedigree, Bickel worried
about the Court’s power and the reception its rulings would receive at the
hands of a recalcitrant public.41 This meant that the Court could not issue its
rulings in a vacuum, irrespective of contrary public opinion and localized
opposition. Instead, the Court must know when to act and when to stay its
hand. In so doing, it must be mindful of political considerations when deciding cases. In his own words, “the techniques and allied devices for staying the Court’s hand . . . mark the point at which the Court gives the electoral institutions their head and itself stays out of politics, and there is nothing paradoxical in finding that here the Court is most a political animal.”42
This is an account of a cautious Court, a Court that cannot assume acquiescence to its rulings. This is not a weak Court, by any means, but rather
a Court that, while grounded in principle, was cognizant of the political
realities of its day. The Supreme Court’s handling of the Virginia miscegenation case soon after Brown, Naim v. Naim,43 afforded Bickel a clear example of his thesis. The infamous edict in Brown II, exhorting compliance
with Brown I at “all deliberate speed,” provided him another, and Bickel
spent many pages in The Least Dangerous Branch making precisely this
claim.44 In both instances, the Court retreats in the face of rabid Southern
opposition.45 And yet, according to Bickel, what choice did the Court really
have? As he wrote:
40. 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (proclaiming that the Court is “supreme in the exposition
of the law of the Constitution”).
41. See Tushnet, supra note 17, at 1229.
42. Bickel, supra note 15, at 51.
43. 350 U.S. 891 (1955) (per curiam), vacating and remanding 87 S.E.2d 749, on
remand, 90 S.E.2d 849; 350 U.S. 891 (1955) (per curiam), motion to recall mandate denied
per curiam, 350 U.S. 985 (1956).
44. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 247-54 (2d ed. 1986).
45. In Naim, the Court faced a constitutional challenge to a Virginia antimiscegenation statute. This was, according to Michael Klarman, “the last case the justices
wished to see on their docket in 1955.” MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL
RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 321 (2004) (“Many
southern whites had charged that the real goal of the NAACP’s school desegregation campaign was ‘to open the bedroom doors of our white women to the Negro men’ and ‘to mongrelize the white race.’ To strike down antimiscegenation laws so soon after Brown risked
appearing to validate those suspicions. Moreover, opinion polls in the 1950s revealed that
over 90 percent of whites, even outside of the South, opposed interracial marriage.”). And so
five Justices “swallowed their collective pride and voted to dismiss the appeal on the ground
that the Virginia court’s response ‘leaves the case devoid of a properly presented federal
question.’” Id. at 323. Klarman concluded that “[a] majority of the justices apparently pre-
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[W]ould it have been wise, at a time when the Court had just pronounced its new
integration principle, when it was subject to scurrilous attack by men who predicted that integration of the schools would lead directly to “mongrelization of the
race” and that this was the result the Court had really willed, would it have been
wise, just then, in the first case of its sort, on an issue that the Negro community as
a whole can hardly be said to be pressing hard at the moment, to declare that the
states may not prohibit racial marriage?46

Of course not, he argued. To some, this signaled a Court caving in to
public pressure and political considerations altogether foreign to constitutional law. To Bickel, the Court ignores these social realities at its peril.
The Court must be prudential, principled, pragmatic, but not blind to social
and political realities.47
It was in this important sense that Bickel referred to the “passive virtues.” These were jurisdictional devices, “certain techniques of the mediating middle way,”48 that allow the Court to stay its hand when prudence demands that it do so. These were the traditional requirements of standing,
case and controversy, ripeness, and the political question doctrine. Bickel’s
main contribution focused on these doctrinal tools; when “imaginatively
utilized,”49 they would allow the Court to enter into a Socratic dialogue with
the political branches and with society as a whole. This meant for Bickel
that the Court must not pursue principle at any and all costs, but rather, it
must walk the thin line between principle and expediency. In his mind, this
was “the unique function of constitutional adjudication in the American
system.”50
The political question doctrine played a central role for Bickel. For
him, “[a]ny progression of instances when the final, constitutional judgment
of the Supreme Court has been or should be withheld culminates naturally
in the nebulous neighborhood of the doctrine of political questions.”51 If the
neighborhood was nebulous in the early 1960s, the passage of time has done
little to improve matters.52 For example, commentators debate whether such
ferred to be humiliated at the hands of truculent state jurists rather than to stoke further the
fires of racial controversy” ignited by Brown. Id. See also Dennis J. Hutchinson, Unanimity
and Desegregation: Decisionmaking in the Supreme Court, 1948–1958, 68 GEO. L.J. 1, 6066 (1979).
46. BICKEL, supra note 44, at 174.
47. For a defense of Bickel on some of these points, see Anthony T. Kronman, Alexander Bickel’s Philosophy of Prudence, 94 YALE L.J. 1567 (1985). For a well-known
critique, see Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the “Passive Virtues”—A Comment on
Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1964).
48. Bickel, supra note 15, at 41.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 50.
51. Id. at 74.
52. See Martin H. Redish, Judicial Review and the “Political Question,” 79 NW. U.
L. REV. 1031, 1031 (1985) (“The doctrine has always proven to be an enigma to commentators.”).
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a doctrine actually exists.53 And even if it does, some argue that the doctrine is “anemic,”54 or should “play no role whatsoever.”55 Commentators
also disagree whether, as Bickel remarked, the doctrine “resists being domesticated.”56 Finally, some commentators focus on what is known as the
“classical” strand of the doctrine, and whether the “Constitution has committed to another agency of government [rather than the courts] the . . . determination of the issue.”57 Others, such as Bickel, focus on what has been
labeled the “prudential” strand.58 Be that as it may, it should be clear why
the political question doctrine, as Bickel understood it, played a central role
in his judicial schema. A mere glance at the factors he offered as the basis
for the doctrine should make this point amply clear:
[T]he Court’s sense of lack of capacity, compounded in unequal parts of (a) the
strangeness of the issue and its intractability to principled resolution; (b) the sheer
momentousness of it, which tends to unbalance judicial judgment; (c) the anxiety,
not so much that judicial judgment will be ignored, as that perhaps it should be, but
will not be; (d) finally and in sum (“in a mature democracy”), the inner vulnerability, the self-doubt of an institution which is electorally irresponsible and has no
earth to draw strength from.59

Two reactions jump out immediately. First, and in line with the previous discussion, Bickel envisioned a Court able and willing to sidestep
controversies as necessary. These factors clearly address the concern that
the Court will overreach at times. Second, this is a description of an anxious, vulnerable institution, not a self-assured and “muscular” one. This
description of the Court is no longer accurate,60 as these were the early

53. Compare Louis Henkin, Is There a “Political Question” Doctrine?, 85 YALE
L.J. 597, 600 (1976) (suggesting that there is no political question doctrine), with Barkow,
supra note 16, at 242 (suggesting there is a political question doctrine), and Redish, supra
note 52, at 1032 (“[A] political question doctrine does in fact exist.”), and Louis Michael
Seidman, The Secret Life of the Political Question Doctrine, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 441,
441-42 (2004) (“[T]he political question doctrine is as central to modern constitutional adjudication as it was to the outcome in Marbury at the beginning of our constitutional history.”).
54. Larry D. Kramer, Popular Constitutionalism, circa 2004, 92 CAL. L. REV. 959,
966 (2004).
55. Redish, supra note 52, at 1033.
56. BICKEL, supra note 44, at 125; compare Seidman, supra note 53, at 442 (“My
argument, then, is that the Court has never—and never can—develop constitutional rules that
control the political judgments, as so understood, that it regularly makes.”), with Tushnet,
supra note 17, at 1204 (disagreeing with the view that the political question doctrine “could
not be reduced to rules, criteria, or even standards”).
57. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 8 (1959).
58. For a description and concomitant critique of the prudential strand, see Redish,
supra note 52, at 1043-55.
59. BICKEL, supra note 44, at 184.
60. See Tushnet, supra note 17, at 1229-34.
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1960s and the Court was still feeling the direct effects of the Brown decision. Context made all the difference in the world.
These factors (or “misgivings,” according to Bickel) are intended to
guide the Court whether to intervene in a given controversy. Of course
these are not absolutes, but questions of degree. And ultimately they add up
to this: sometimes, questions are deemed political on the principled ground
that the area should be governed without rules. Or, according to Bickel,
political questions involve “discretionary functions of the political institutions, which are unprincipled on principle, because we think ‘that the job is
better done without rules,’ and there is no reason why their legitimacy as
such should not be affirmed by the Court.”61 His examples include, among
others, whether the government recognizes foreign governments and unilateral abrogation of treaties.
Alexander Bickel’s account of judicial review offers a cautious, prudential Court that is aware of its limitations and the need to understand the
context in which its rulings must be carried out. Under Kramer’s descriptive account, the Court does not fear anyone, and it knows it does not have
to. Bickel’s account is far different, for here the Court is willing to postpone difficult issues for a better day. Prudence demands no other way.

C. A Middle Ground? Judicial Minimalism and the “Constructive Uses of
Silence”
In contrast to Kramer’s account of the Rehnquist Court and Bickel’s
purportedly prudential account, Cass Sunstein’s Foreword offered a middle
ground between a view of the Court as exclusive interpreter and a Court
cognizant of its own limitations and its place in our constitutional universe.62 This is an account of a Court whose doctrines “serve to ensure
against outcomes reached without sufficient accountability and reflecting
factional power instead of reason-giving in the public domain.”63 Put a different way, the approach described here is “democracy-forcing,” in that it
leaves issues open for democratic deliberation and promotes reason-giving.
Tellingly, Sunstein “describe[s] the phenomenon . . . as ‘decisional minimalism.’”64 This approach is particularly sensible when the Court deals
with highly complex issues or issues that divide the public.65
61. Bickel, supra note 15, at 76.
62. See Neal Devins, The Democracy-Forcing Constitution, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1971,
1993 (1999) (reviewing CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON
THE SUPREME COURT (1999)) (“Sunstein’s call for narrow and shallow decisionmaking may
prove a critical (if incomplete) bridge between the ‘passive virtues’ and active judicial review.”).
63. Sunstein, Leaving Things, supra, note 15, at 8.
64. Id. at 6-7 (emphasis added). For extensive analysis of judicial minimalism, see
Sheldon Gelman, The Hedgehog, the Fox, and the Minimalist, 89 GEO. L.J. 2297 (2001)
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In line with these justifications, a minimalist judge eschews broad
rules and theoretical abstractions, focusing instead only on the necessities of
the case under consideration. Like Bickel’s judge, a minimalist judge is a
cautious judge, a strategic judge, and a pragmatic judge.66 It is a judge who
sticks closely to precedents, a judge who deals in closely related hypothetical scenarios, a judge who acknowledges the unaccountable nature of her
office and the primacy of the legislature, and a judge who looks for
“grounds on which people can converge from diverse theoretical positions.”67 It is a judge who says only as much as necessary to justify a decision, and not a word more.
These values translate into actual decisions in two central ways. First,
minimalism demands narrow, as opposed to wide, opinions. This means
simply that judges decide the case in front of them and do not attempt to
decide other cases into the future. They do not lay down broad rules. Sunstein offers Romer v. Evans68 and United States v. Lopez69 as examples of
narrow opinions. Second, minimalist judges try not to tackle issues of basic
principle head-on, but instead try to reach “incompletely theorized agreements.”70 This does not mean that minimalist judges avoid giving reasons;
instead, they offer “[r]easoned but theoretically unambitious accounts”71 and
do not discuss first principles. It is in this way that minimalist decisions are
shallow, not deep. In so doing, such decisions allow a disagreeing public to
unite behind outcomes when they disagree about abstractions, or to agree
about abstractions when agreement on outcomes is impossible. They also
allow the Justices to put their own disagreements to the side and agree on an
outcome and a modest rationale in defense of their position. Sunstein also
catalogues Romer and Lopez under the “shallow” rubric.
Thus, judicial minimalism finds a middle ground between aggressive
review and judicial passivity. While a minimalist court acts, it does so in
shallow and narrow ways. It is in this way that Sunstein’s account diverges
(reviewing CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME
COURT (1999)); Peters, supra, note 17.
65. Bradley Canon refers to these as “politico-moral disputes.” Bradley C. Canon,
The Supreme Court as a Cheerleader in Politico-Moral Disputes, 54 J. POL. 637 (1992). He
defines these as issues for which the public perceives a right or wrong answer.
66. See Sunstein, Leaving Things, supra note 15, at 9 & n.8.
67. Id. at 15.
68. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
69. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). But see Stephen M. Griffin, Has the Hour of Democracy
Come Around at Last? The New Critique of Judicial Review, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 683, 69091 (2000) (contending that Lopez is not a minimalist decision; or at the very least, Sunstein
does not make the case that it is); see also Gelman, supra note 64, at 2321 (criticizing Sunstein’s discussion of Lopez, because “[i]t misses Lopez’s significance by focusing narrowly on
formal aspects of the opinion, ignoring what seems apparent to everyone else”).
70. Sunstein, Leaving Things, supra note 15, at 20.
71. Id. at 21.
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from Bickel’s. Yet, Sunstein acknowledges, the two projects are “easily
linked.”72 For example, in specific reference to the debate over the political
question doctrine, Sunstein might argue that the doctrine reduces the costs
of decision while allowing the properly democratic actors the room needed
to make their preferred choices. It is in this way that Sunstein suggests that
the “passive virtues” are best analyzed if seen as minimalist tools. A minimalist judge may choose not to act as well.

II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF MINORITY VOTE DILUTION
These models of judicial intervention help tell the story of the development of the law of democracy. Within the space of a few years, the Court
moved from non-intervention on prudential grounds (what we refer to as the
Colegrove Era) to careful intervention (the Baker Era) to complete and aggressive control of the field (the post-Reynolds Era). The Court is now in
charge of our politics, unabashed and unafraid.
This is not a particularly newsworthy insight, yet no less important.
Standing alone, the fact that the Court is now in control of our politics can
be a good thing, particularly if one feels—as many do—that the political
process often malfunctions and the Court must stand ready to strike a blow
in defense of democratic values.73 But this insight does not stand alone;
rather, it presses against the fact that the law of democracy is an incoherent
mess, and that the Court is directly at fault in mishandling its regulation of
the democratic process.
It is as a way out of this quandary that Professor Gerken offered her
theory of an interregnum, which posits the Court in a holding pattern, patiently waiting for a new majority to emerge before moving forward.74 The
problem with this view is that the Court’s treatment of modern election law
controversies is anything but “unique;” in fact, it might even be predictable.
The Court has functioned in a disjointed manner since it first entered the
political thicket. Often, the doctrine is more confusing after the Court has
“spoken.”75 We do not think that the Court is biding its time for a new majority to emerge; instead, individual Justices are struggling to deal with the
difficult issues that inhere in this area, the same as they always have.
72. Id. at 51.
73. See Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Constitutional Pluralism and Democratic Politics:
Reflections on the Interpretive Approach of Baker v. Carr, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1103 (2002).
74. Gerken, Rashomon, supra note 8, at 1213 (noting that the “doctrinal interregnum
continues” with the Roberts Court); Gerken, Lost, supra note 10, at 504 (asserting that the
Court is “in a doctrinal holding pattern, unsure of where to go next”).
75. See, e.g., Bolden v. City of Mobile, 542 F. Supp. 1050, 1071 (S.D. Ala. 1982)
(showing that the district court found the Supreme Court’s opinion unclear as to whether to
apply the effect or purpose test when considering the 1975 Amendment to § 2 of the Voting
Rights Act).
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For support, we could offer myriad doctrinal niches, from political and
racial gerrymandering to pre-clearance under Section 5 of the Voting Rights
Act to campaign finance law. This Part focuses on the Court’s treatment of
minority vote dilution. We conclude that the case law in this area is unclear
and incoherent, no different from what we see in other areas of the law of
democracy. “Sloppy” opinions by Justices offering their individual notions
on politics, democracy, and the law are the norm. We further show that
minority vote dilution was never “resolved” by the Court, despite the fact
that the Court had numerous opportunities to put an end to the confusion.
To this day, the doctrine remains in flux, as exemplified by the recent
LULAC and Bartlett cases.
The dilution question arose squarely in the 1960s, once the Court decided—in Reynolds v. Sims—that “the right of suffrage can be denied by a
debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen’s vote just as effectively as
by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise.” 76 In so holding,
the Court must then determine what mechanisms a state could—or could
not—use to dilute the force of minority voters. The question became particularly acute upon passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965,77 when eligible black voters began to register in significant numbers.78 This increase in
black registration resulted in, inter alia, the emergence of multi-member
districts, devices that served to cancel out minority voting strength.79 Interestingly, these devices were permitted—even encouraged—by the Court’s
“one person, one vote” equal protection decisions of the 1960s. These atlarge elections and multi-member districts allowed states to satisfy the constitutional requirements of “one person, one vote” while “blunting the effects of rising black voting strength.”80 It would only be a matter of time
76. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1965).
77. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1965).
78. Stanley A. Halpin, Jr., Beyond Vote Dilution: An Essay on Fair and Effective
Representation in the American Democratic System, 22 S.U. L. REV. 99, 108 (1994).
79. Id. at 108. The establishment of at-large election districts dates back to the late
nineteenth century and the Progressive Era. It also coincides, specifically in the South, with
what Davidson and Korbel label the “peak of racial reaction.” Chandler Davidson & George
Korbel, At-Large Elections and Minority Group Representation: A Reexamination of Historical and Contemporary Evidence, in MINORITY VOTE DILUTION 65, 67-68 (Chandler Davidson ed., 1984). In this vein, multi-member districts must be placed alongside poll taxes,
literacy tests, grandfather clauses, and white primaries as mechanisms by which to disenfranchise specific segments of the voting public. This characterization requires little support, in
light of the practical advantages of these districts for anyone wishing to submerge a minority
group within a larger population. Clearly, and more specifically, multi-member districts
automatically render minority groups within a larger political subdivision hopeless and helpless in the face of a majority that seldom betrays their intra-group political affections. Their
history lends much support to this position. Id. at 69-71. The abolition of districts and the
establishment of an at-large system was an easy way to neutralize a growing political minority. In the South, it happened all too often.
80. Halpin, supra note 78, at 108.
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before the Court examined the constitutionality of these attempts to dilute
the black vote.81
A. The Early Cases: Struggling to Apply Reynolds to Multi-Member Districts
The Court first addressed the validity of at-large elections in Fortson
v. Dorsey,82 albeit in a vague and unclear manner. The issue in Fortson was
narrowly framed as an equal protection issue—whether “county-wide voting in the seven multi-district counties results in denying the residents therein a vote ‘approximately equal in weight to that of’ voters resident in the
single-member constituencies.”83 The Court answered this question in the
negative. As it wrote, “[t]here is clearly no mathematical disparity.”84 This
was not a remarkable conclusion; only a year earlier, the Court stated in
Reynolds that single-member districts were not constitutionally required by
the Equal Protection Clause.85 However, this was not to say that the claim
was foreclosed from constitutional review. As the Court further explained,
“our opinion is not to be understood to say that in all instances or under all
circumstances such a system as Georgia has will comport with the dictates
of the Equal Protection Clause.”86 There might be times, the Court proceeded, that “designedly or otherwise, a multi-member constituency apportionment scheme, under the circumstances of a particular case, would operate to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or political elements of the voting population.”87 When the case comes before it, the Court
concluded in Fortson that the question would be considered. Fortson was
not such a case.
This was a question that did not have to wait long to be answered. In
Whitcomb v. Chavis, the Court faced a challenge to a multi-member district
in Marion County, Indiana, alleged to have the “force and effect” of diluting
the vote of residents of certain segments within the county.88 In light of
multi-member districts in general, the claim was rather simple. The residents of the neighborhood in question—termed the “ghetto area”—were
poor, and approximately two-thirds of them were black (Center Town-

81. Id. at 108-09 (detailing how at-large elections in Louisiana were operated to
dilute black voting strength).
82. 379 U.S. 433 (1965).
83. Id. at 436-37.
84. Id. at 437.
85. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577 (1964) (“One body could be composed of
single-member districts while the other could have at least some multimember districts.”).
86. Fortson, 379 U.S. at 439.
87. Id.
88. 403 U.S. 124, 128 (1971).
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ship).89 The three-judge court first compared their political interests and
found them quite distinct from those of wealthy whites and middle class
blacks (Washington Township), groups found in two neighboring districts.
More troubling, the numbers stacked squarely against them. Looking at the
five general assemblies elected from 1960 to 1968, the disparities were
clear. The court then compared the populations between districts, and the
“ghetto area” once again came short; while its population was large enough
to select two representatives and one senator under a single-member districting system, it had been represented only once in the senate and three
times in the house. In contrast, the wealthier districts had been able to select representatives disproportionate to their overall population; even tract
220, with only 0.66% of the county’s population, had selected more representatives than the “ghetto area.”90 On these facts, the lower court concluded that the multi-member district violated the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Supreme Court was not impressed. In an opinion authored by
Justice White, the Court began its analysis by repeating its dictum in Fortson about the possibility of a successful challenge to a multi-member districting plan, given the proper facts. The Court also added, somewhat
ominously, that “[w]e have not yet sustained such an attack.”91 Whitcomb
would not be the first case to do so, for two reasons. First, the Court echoed
earlier warnings in explaining that only purposeful districting plans, either
as conceived or as carried out, violate the Fourteenth Amendment. On the
facts here, the evidence did not support such a conclusion.
Second, the Court turned to the population disparities and the argument that such disparities, standing alone, reflect the requisite discriminatory purpose.92 The argument here was that the numbers speak for themselves, for, as the Court explained in Fortson, the multi-member plan operated to minimize and even cancel out the voting power of blacks.93 The
Court did not accept this argument.94 To begin, it required specific evidence
demonstrating that ghetto residents had in fact less opportunities to participate and elect representatives of their choice.95 In the Court’s view, none
had been put forth:
We have discovered nothing in the record or in the court’s findings indicating that
poor Negroes were not allowed to register or vote, to choose the political party
they desired to support, to participate in its affairs or to be equally represented on
those occasions when legislative candidates were chosen. Nor did the evidence
purport to show or the court find that inhabitants of the ghetto were regularly ex89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 131.
Id. at 133.
Id. at 144.
Whitcomb, 403 U.S. at 149-50.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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cluded from the slates of both major parties, thus denying them the chance of occupying legislative seats.96

Instead, according to the Court, this case was not about race but politics. Ghetto residents did not elect one of their own mainly because they
generally identify more strongly with the Democratic Party; yet, Republicans had won four of the last five elections.97 The Court concluded that the
argument that the voting power of the residents of the Ghetto had been cancelled out, “seems a mere euphemism for political defeat at the polls.”98
Dissenting in part and concurring in the result in part, Justice Douglas,
joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, offered a different view of the
constitutional standard in multi-member districting cases. More specifically, he argued that a showing of racial motivation was not required in these
cases; instead, the evidence on the record must only reflect an invidious
effect.99 Yet, it is not entirely clear how an “effects” inquiry would be carried out in the redistricting context short of enacting a proportional representation system. Advocates of this test must provide an answer to this
question. Justice Douglas does. In partial agreement with the majority,
Justice Douglas implied that this would be a fact-specific inquiry.100 For
example, in Whitcomb, he agreed that the requisite invidious effect had been
established on the strength of four findings:
(1) the showing of an identifiable voting group living in Center Township, (2) the
severe discrepancies of residency of elected members of the general assembly between Center and Washington Townships, . . . (3) the finding of pervasive influence of the county organizations of the political parties, and (4) the finding that
legislators from the county maintain ‘common, undifferentiated’ positions on political issues.101

This was another way of saying that numbers alone will not be
enough. In order to prove the unconstitutionality of multi-member districts,
more evidence than just mere disproportionate impact would be needed.
The reach of Whitcomb was less than clear. Did the Court really mean
that multi-member districts could operate to dilute minority voting strength?
The Court’s ominous statement that “[w]e have not yet sustained such an
attack”102 might suggest otherwise. And what were lower courts to make of
the Court’s focus on access to the political process? If minorities were “allowed to register [and] vote, to choose the political party they desired to
support, to participate in [governmental] affairs [and] to be equally
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id. at 149-50 (citation omitted).
Whitcomb, 403 U.S. at 152.
Id. at 153.
Id. at 177 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part and concurring in the result in part).
Id. at 179.
Id.
Id. at 144.
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represented on those occasions when legislative candidates were chosen,”103
would a challenge fail? And what did “allow,” “participate,” and “be equally represented” mean? This confusion is seen in lower court opinions after
Whitcomb.
For example, in Kelly v. Bumpers,104 the lower court focused on the
language in Whitcomb that indicated that access to the political process was
all that was protected. In the court’s words:
The holding of the Supreme Court was that where minority groups are permitted to
participate freely in the overall political process, they do not suffer unconstitutional
discrimination simply because they may not be able to elect members of their own
groups to the Legislature as they would be able to do if they were voting in a single
member district or in single member districts. To put it another way, the Court held
that the Constitution does not assure minorities, whether racial or political, proportional representation or “safe seats” in the Legislature.105

For this court, the focus was on the ability of minorities to participate,
which it understood only as the formal act of voting.
In contrast, the lower court in Howell v. Mahan,106 a case decided less
than a month after Whitcomb, hardly discussed Whitcomb when it ruled on
the constitutionality of a reapportionment plan adopted by the Virginia assembly—a plan that included multi-member districts.107 To this court, it
appeared that the issue was resolved in Whitcomb: multi-member districts
were acceptable, as long as they were not “too ‘large.’”108 The court’s only
discussion of Whitcomb was a recitation that multi-member districts are not
unconstitutional.109 Judge Lewis, concurring in Howell, noted that the objections to large multi-member districts were “disposed of in the Indiana
case.”110 He noted that it “hardly follows that a fifteen-member delegation
is constitutionally permissible in Indiana and an eleven-member delegation
is constitutionally impermissible in Virginia.”111 However, location might
have everything to do with the permissibility of multi-member districts—at
least in the early 1970s.
Understandably, the Supreme Court returned to this issue soon after
the Whitcomb decision. The case was White v. Regester.112 In White, the
103. Whitcomb, 403 U.S. at 149 (citation omitted).
104. 340 F. Supp. 568 (E.D. Ark. 1972).
105. Id. at 583 (citing Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 148-160 (1971)).
106. 330 F. Supp. 1138 (E.D. Va. 1971), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 410 U.S. 315
(1973).
107. Id. at 1139.
108. Id. at 1146 (citing Connor v. Johnson, 402 U.S. 690, 692 (1971)).
109. Howell, 330 F. Supp. at 1146 (noting that multi-member districts are “not per se
unconstitutional”); id. at 1147 (finding multi-member districts in such cases are not unconstitutional.).
110. Id. at 1148.
111. Id.
112. 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
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Court was again presented with multi-member districts alleged to dilute
minority voting strength, this time in south Texas.113 The Court changed
course again, holding these multi-member districts invalid under the Constitution.114 The White Court found that the district court properly relied on the
“totality of the circumstances,”115 including the history of discrimination of
Mexican-Americans in Bexar County (San Antonio, Texas) and blacks in
Dallas County (Dallas, Texas)—the two multi-member districts at issue in
the case—in reaching the determination that the multi-member districts violated the Constitution.116 The Court seemed to put great weight into two
findings, which applied to both counties.
First, the Court looked at Texas’ racial history and specifically its history of de jure racial discrimination.117 This is a history, the Court explained, that was often reflected in electoral arenas.118 Second, the Court
looked to specific electoral practices and—in the case of Dallas County—
concluded that few blacks had been elected for state political office in Texas, that the parties did very little to gain blacks’ general political support,
and that representatives did not even attempt to further the interests of the
black community.119 The crucial distinction between White and Whitcomb is
thus the backdrop upon which their respective multi-member systems are
reflected. In this way, it seemed as though the South, with its Jim Crow
legacy, provided much more fertile ground for these kinds of lawsuits.
One lower court read White in this way, finding that the “complexion”120 of North Dakota was such that the multi-member districts at issue did
“not present any showing of unrepresented minorities or unresponsive representatives.”121 However, the Texas district court—addressing White on
remand—noted that “[p]olitical access is not a vapid phrase confined within
a rigid formula, but is frequently perpetuated by mores, folkways, and customs.”122 It went on to look at many political and historical factors to determine what multi-member districts were (or were not) constitutionally
permissible.123

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id. at 756.
Id. at 765.
Id. at 768-69.
Id. at 769.
White, 412 U.S. at 766-69.
Id.
Id.
Chapman v. Meier, 372 F. Supp. 371, 377 (D.N.D. 1974).
Id.
Graves v. Barnes, 378 F. Supp. 640, 643 (W.D. Tex. 1974).
Id.

438

Michigan State Law Review

[Vol. 2009:417

Because the doctrinal standard of dilution was “vague,”124 courts
struggled to interpret just how to go about determining what actions constituted impermissible vote dilution. In response to this uncertainty, the Fifth
Circuit, sitting en banc, developed a list of non-exclusive factors—the
“Zimmer factors”—that should typically be considered when determining
whether an at-large election scheme has a racially discriminatory purpose or
effect.125 According to the Fifth Circuit:
[W]here a minority can demonstrate a lack of access to the process of slating candidates, the unresponsiveness of legislators to their particularized interests, a tenuous state policy underlying the preference for multi-member or at-large districting, or that the existence of past discrimination in general precludes the effective
participation in the election system, a strong case is made. Such proof is enhanced
by a showing of the existence of large districts, majority vote requirements, antisingle shot voting provisions and the lack of provision for at-large candidates running from particular geographical subdistricts. The fact of dilution is established
upon proof of the existence of an aggregate of these factors. . . . [A]ll these factors
need not be proved in order to obtain relief.126

When the Zimmer opinion came before the Supreme Court in East
Carroll Parish School Board v. Marshall, the Court avoided the constitutional issue presented in the case and affirmed the Fifth Circuit’s decision
on a narrow ground: that the district court’s equitable remedy of an at-large
election was inappropriate. 127 The Court held that the district court should
employ single-member districts “absent unusual circumstances.”128 The
Court thus avoided ruling on whether a discriminatory effect was permissible, and whether the Zimmer factors were appropriately considered in determining the discriminatory effect. This state of uncertainty is reflected in
lower court decisions.
Between Whitcomb and City of Mobile v. Bolden129—a case where the
Court drastically changed course with respect to its dilution jurisprudence—
forty-six district court cases addressed the constitutionality of multi-member
districts and at-large elections.130 The first case to find a multi-member dis124. See Equal Protection of the Laws—Reapportionment—Multimember Districting
of County Governing Bodies May Work Unconstitutional Dilution of Minority Voting
Strength—Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc), petition for cert.
filed sub nom. East Carroll Parish School Bd. v. Marshall, 42 U.S.L.W. 3374 (U.S. Dec. 3,
1973) (No. 861), 87 HARV. L. REV. 1851, 1856 (1974); id. at 1859 (“The decision of the
Supreme Court in Regester to review the effectiveness of minority representation under
[multi-member] schemes may ultimately be judged a prudent one only if subsequent cases
apply an effectiveness test in some more predictable manner.”).
125. Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297, 1305 (5th Cir. 1973) (listing factors).
126. Id. (citation omitted).
127. 424 U.S. 636 (1976).
128. Id. at 639.
129. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
130. These cases were found by running the following search in Westlaw: “403 U.S.
124” or “412 U.S. 755.” This search produced ninety-eight district court cases during the
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trict constitutionally invalid was the district court decision in White v. Regester.131 Sixteen cases found multi-member districts or at-large elections
invalid under the Federal Constitution, and twenty-one upheld the constitutionality of the districts.132 All of the cases invalidating multi-member districts were cases in the South—specifically, Alabama,133 Georgia,134 Louisiana,135 Mississippi,136 and Texas.137 Before Zimmer was decided, district
courts relied on a variety of factors and rationales to determine the validity
of multi-member districts. For instance, some cases focused the inquiry on
access to the political process,138 another found it dispositive that the plan—
adopted by the court—was not designed to dilute minority votes,139 and
another found it important that the multi-member district was not “too
‘large.’”140 After Zimmer was decided, the lower courts consistently relied
on the Fifth Circuit’s Zimmer factors for guidance,141 despite the fact that the
Court refused to rule on the validity of these factors in East Carroll Parish
School Board.142 Zimmer offered some much-needed guidance to lower
courts, not the Supreme Court.
The Court’s failure to provide any coherence in this area is not due to
a lack of opportunity. Only one year after the Court refused to offer guidance on the relevant factors for dilution cases in East Carroll Parish School
Board, the Court had another chance to lend clarity in United Jewish Or-

applicable time period, 1970 until April 22, 1980, the day Bolden was decided. However,
only forty-six of those cases dealt with the constitutionality of multi-member districts.
131. Graves v. Barnes, 343 F. Supp. 704 (W.D. Tex. 1972), aff’d in part, rev’d in
part sub nom. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
132. One case upheld some of the multi-member districts it ruled on, but invalidated
others. Graves v. Barnes, 378 F. Supp. 640 (W.D. Tex. 1974), vacated sub nom. White v.
Regester, 422 U.S. 935 (1975).
133. Hendrix v. McKinney, 460 F. Supp. 626 (M.D. Ala. 1978); Brown v. Moore,
428 F. Supp. 1123 (S.D. Ala. 1976); Bolden v. City of Mobile, 423 F. Supp. 384 (S.D. Ala.
1976); Yelverton v. Driggers, 370 F. Supp. 612 (M.D. Ala. 1974).
134. Paige v. Gray, 437 F. Supp. 137 (M.D. Ga. 1977); Paige v. Gray, 399 F. Supp.
459 (M.D. Ga. 1975); Pitts v. Busbee, 395 F. Supp. 35 (N.D. Ga. 1975).
135. Ausberry v. City of Monroe, 456 F. Supp. 460 (W.D. La. 1978); Parnell v. Rapides Parish Sch. Bd., 425 F. Supp. 399 (W.D. La. 1976); Blacks United for Lasting Leadership v. City of Shreveport, 71 F.R.D. 623 (W.D. La. 1976); Wallace v. House, 377 F. Supp.
1192 (W.D. La. 1974); Beer v. United States, 374 F. Supp. 363 (D.D.C. 1974) (adjudicating
a case out of New Orleans, Louisiana).
136. Stewart v. Waller, 404 F. Supp. 206 (N.D. Miss. 1975).
137. Lipscomb v. Wise, 399 F. Supp. 782 (N.D. Tex. 1975); Graves v. Barnes, 378 F.
Supp. 640 (W.D. Tex. 1974); Graves v. Barnes, 343 F. Supp. 704 (W.D. Tex. 1972).
138. See, e.g., Kelly v. Bumpers, 340 F. Supp. 569, 584 (E.D. Ark. 1972).
139. Holt v. City of Richmond, 334 F. Supp. 228, 241 (E.D. Va. 1971).
140. Howell v. Mahan, 330 F. Supp. 1138, 1146 (E.D. Va. 1971) (quoting Connor v.
Johnson, 402 U.S. 690, 692 (1971)).
141. See, e.g., Lipscomb, 399 F. Supp. at 789.
142. East Carroll Parish Sch. Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976).
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ganizations v. Carey (UJO).143 The case was brought by a group of Hasidic
Jews who alleged that the value of their votes was diluted when their community, which was contained within a single senate and assembly district,
was “split” during a reapportionment to provide for a majority non-white
district to comply with Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.144 These facts
provided the Court with an ideal vehicle to clarify its position about the
nature of group rights engendered by the Regester opinion.
Unsurprisingly, the Court declined to provide much needed clarity to
this area of the law.145 The plurality opinion refrained from offering any
commentary or clarity on the dilution claim. Instead, the plurality focused
on the fact that the redistricting presented “no racial slur or stigma with respect to whites,” as there was no “fencing out of the white population from
participation in the political processes of the county, and the plan did not
minimize or unfairly cancel out white voting strength.”146 Again, the plurality did not offer any meaningful guidance to lower courts on how to adjudicate dilution claims. The Justices, predictably, refused to compromise and
neglected to develop the doctrine, other than through their individual commentaries on the role of race and redistricting.147
B. The Court Changes Course—Again
Rather than provide clarity to this uncertain area, the Court only muddied the waters further in its next installment: City of Mobile v. Bolden.148
Anyone looking for simplicity in this area came away sorely disappointed;
the Justices spoke through the course of six separate opinions—the Justices
could not even agree with one another, much less provide clarity within this
area. The setting was by now a familiar one. In their complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that the multi-member system for the election of Mobile’s
143. 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
144. Id.
145. Note, United Jewish Organizations v. Carey and the Need to Recognize Aggregate Voting Rights, 87 YALE L.J. 571, 576 (1978) (complaining that the Court declined “to
resolve the uncertainties that persisted after Regester”).
146. United Jewish Orgs., 430 U.S. at 165.
147. Tellingly, the doctrine remained in flux well into the 1990s, with Shaw v. Reno,
509 U.S. 630 (1993), and its progeny. In Shaw, the dissenting justices pointed to UJO for
support, while the O’Connor majority looked elsewhere while dismissing UJO as outside the
scope of these new facts. Id. at 657-58. The nature of aggregate rights remains both elusive
and contested. Of note, Professor Gerken published her influential criticism of the Court’s
approach to vote dilution, Heather K. Gerken, Understanding the Right to an Undiluted Vote,
114 HARV. L. REV. 1665 (2001), almost 30 years after UJO. The Court is either unaware of
the central questions in this area, or simply unable or unwilling to resolve them. That Shaw
causes of action essentially disappeared after Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001), lead
us to the conclusion that these questions are too difficult for the Court to handle.
148. 446 U.S. 55 (1980) (plurality opinion).
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three-member City Commission diluted the voting strength of black voters
in violation of both the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, as well as
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Following a bench trial, and while adhering to the Whitcomb, White, and Zimmer line of cases, the district court
ruled in favor of the plaintiffs,149 and the court of appeals affirmed the
judgment in its entirety.150
The Supreme Court reversed in a plurality opinion.151 In an opinion
authored by Justice Stewart, the Court began its analysis by discarding the
Zimmer formula.152 In its stead, the Court turned to the proper constitutional
standards.153 In examining the three claims separately, the Court concluded
at the onset that Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act must be understood as
codifying the command of the Fifteenth Amendment.154 As such, these two
claims were merged into one.155 Then, when turning to the constitutional
standard, the Court concluded that both the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments must be understood to adopt the infamous intent standard.156
Within the ambit of the Fifteenth Amendment, the Court offered its reading
of Guinn v. United States, Gomillion v. Lightfoot, and the White Primary
Cases for support.157 In light of recent case law, it may be said that the argument under the Fourteenth Amendment bore an easier burden; the Court
offered here Wright v. Rockefeller, Washington v. Davis, White v. Regester,
and Gaffney v. Cummings.158
So understood, this analysis thus posed a relatively simple question:
did the establishment and maintenance of the at-large system in Mobile date
back to racial hatred and animus against black voters? The district court
answered this question affirmatively, on the strength of two factors: that no
black had ever been elected to the city commission, and that city officials
were unresponsive to the interests of black residents, or were at least less
responsive than to the interests of whites.159 These two findings led the district court to the conclusion that the system was invidiously discriminato-

149. Bolden v. City of Mobile, 423 F. Supp. 384, 404 (S.D. Ala. 1976).
150. Bolden v. City of Mobile, 571 F.2d 238, 247 (5th Cir. 1978).
151. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 80.
152. Id. at 71.
153. Id. at 60-61.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 62.
157. Id. at 62-65 (citing Guinn v. United States, 236 U.S. 347 (1915); Gomillion v.
Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Terry v. Adams,
345 U.S. 461 (1953)).
158. Id. at 66-69 (citing Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964); Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973); Gaffney v. Cummings,
412 U.S. 735 (1973)).
159. Bolden v. City of Mobile, 423 F. Supp. 384, 402 (S.D. Ala. 1976).
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ry.160 The court of appeals affirmed this judgment. 161 As we know, the Supreme Court disagreed. Two points are worth discussing.
First, the Court looked to the support provided by the district court for
its inference of invidious discrimination. The Court writes,
The only indication given by the District Court of an inference that there existed an
invidious purpose was the following statement: “It is not a long step from the systematic exclusion of blacks from juries which is itself such an ‘unequal application
of the law . . . as to show intentional discrimination,’ . . . to [the] present purpose
to dilute the black vote as evidenced in this case.”162

More specifically, the lower court, explained, “There is a ‘current’
condition of dilution of the black vote resulting from intentional state legislative inaction which is as effective as the intentional state action referred to
in Keyes.”163 To be sure, this is a cryptic sentence. Perhaps, the Court
means that the implementation of the at-large system at issue must be explained like the jury exclusion cases, only on racial grounds. The Court
concludes that this is not so, for such an “inference is contradicted by the
history of the adoption of that system in Mobile.”164 Curiously, however,
the Court offers nary a shred of evidence on this point. All we have from
the Bolden opinion is a passage early on when the Court simply asserted
that the Alabama legislature authorized all large municipalities to adopt a
commission as its form of government and required them to hold elections
for such seats on an at-large basis.165 We also have a further passage in a
footnote where the Court posits that “a system of at-large city elections in
place of elections of city officials by the voters of small geographic wards
was universally heralded not many years ago as a praiseworthy and progressive reform of corrupt municipal government.”166 That is all. Thus, when
the Court concludes that the establishment of the at-large system in Mobile
is devoid of a racial purpose, we must take the point on faith, not on the
evidence.
Second, the Court makes clear that simply pointing to the practice of
multi-member districting and its deleterious effects on minority groups
within them is not enough to meet the constitutional test.167 A plaintiff must
offer more than the mere establishment of a facially neutral electoral prac160. Id.
161. Bolden v. City of Mobile, 571 F.2d 238, 247 (5th Cir. 1978).
162. See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 71 n.17 (1980) (plurality opinion)
(internal citations omitted).
163. Bolden, 423 F. Supp. at 398 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
164. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 72 n.17.
165. See id. at 59.
166. Id. at 70 n.15 (citing E. BANFIELD & J. WILSON, CITY POLITICS 151 (1963); M.
SEASONGOOD, LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (1933); L. STEFFENS, THE SHAME
OF THE CITIES (1904)).
167. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 74.
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tice. Multi-member districts, the Court concludes, “are far from proof that
the at-large electoral scheme represents purposeful discrimination against
Negro voters.”168 This is a curious position to take in light of the previous
point. Put simply, the Court demands evidence from the plaintiffs in order
to meet the exacting constitutional test, yet requires very little from the
state. Thus, this position is quite deferential to multi-member districts in
general and their use. The general history of the practice will not do, or the
social context, or its effects over time. Apparently, nothing short of a
“smoking gun” will do.
On remand, the district court “pieced together” the six separate opinions, noting that “[f]ive justices agree, therefore, that this court and the
court of appeals applied the wrong legal standard, although no majority
agreed on the details of the correct standard.”169 The court also noted that
“[o]ne of the six and the other three justices apparently held such purpose
had been shown,”170 and determined that its “obligation” on remand was to
“take additional evidence and evaluate that evidence and the record and
make such additional findings as necessary to decide the issue of discriminatory purpose (intent) under the proper standard.”171 The court did take
additional evidence, namely a comprehensive history of the municipal government and statistical information related to the current electoral system in
Mobile.
The court pulled three principles from the Bolden line of cases: (1) “an
intent to discriminate is a necessary element of a violation of the fourteenth
and fifteenth amendments;” (2) “discriminatory intent need not be the sole
purpose behind the challenged action;” and (3) “the decision maker must
have ‘selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part “because of” not merely “in spite of” its adverse effects upon an identifiable
group.’”172 From these principles, the court determined that it should inquire into the discriminatory purpose in the adoption of the at-large commission system and whether the discriminatory system had adverse effects
on the plaintiffs.173 The court, not surprisingly, found that “the principal
motivating factors for the at-large election system for the Mobile City
Commission was the purpose (intent) to discriminate against blacks, and to
deny them access to the political process and political office. . . . [and] that
the effects of this discriminatory intent continues [sic] to the present.”174

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Id.
Bolden v. City of Mobile, 542 F. Supp. 1050, 1053 (S.D. Ala. 1982).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1072 (internal citations omitted).
Bolden, 542 F. Supp. at 1073.
Id. at 1077.
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The court, therefore, found that the at-large system violated both Section 2
of the Voting Rights Act and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.175
One more doctrinal twist occurred in the Court’s dilution jurisprudence in Rogers v. Lodge,176 which was decided three months after the district court addressed Bolden on remand.177 In Rogers, the Court upheld the
intent requirement of Bolden, but also upheld a lower court’s finding that an
at-large election scheme was unconstitutional because, while “racially neutral when adopted, [it was] being maintained for invidious purposes” in
violation of appellees’ Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment rights.178 This
case might best be explained by pending congressional legislation, as it was
decided two days after Congress legislatively overturned Bolden with the
1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act.179
C. Congress to the Rescue?
The same year Rogers was decided, Congress overruled City of Mobile and returned to the “effect” standard through its amendment to Section
2 of the Voting Rights Act.180 The amendment prohibited electoral systems
that resulted in vote dilution, regardless of the underlying purpose.181 Section 2(b) provided that Section 2(a) is violated where the
totality of circumstances [reveals] . . . that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) in that its
members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate
in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice. The extent to
which members of a protected class have been elected to office in the State or political subdivision is one circumstance which may be considered: Provided, That
nothing in this section establishes a right to have members of a protected class
elected in numbers equal to their participation in the population.182

The purpose of the amendment was to return the state of the law to the
Whitcomb, White, and Zimmer line of cases.183 In so doing, it cannot be said
that Congress brought needed structure and clarity to the law. After all,
Congress sought to codify the case law prior to Bolden, so the earlier complexities were bound to rise again. Of greater interest for our larger thesis is
175. Id.
176. 458 U.S. 613 (1982).
177. Compare Roger v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982) (decided July 1st), with Bolden
v. City of Mobile, 542 F. Supp. 1050 (S.D. Ala. 1982) (decided April 15th).
178. Roger, 458 U.S. at 622.
179. Armand Derfner, Vote Dilution and the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982,
in MINORITY VOTE DILUTION 145, 160 (1989).
180. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1982).
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. See Derfner, supra note 179, at 152.
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what happened soon after the 1982 amendments. Four years later, in
Thornburg v. Gingles,184 a splintered Court sought to cabin the “totality of
circumstances” inquiry by recasting the factors under the amended Section
2 as a three-part evidentiary inquiry.185 The 1982 amendment to Section 2
brought the Court’s dilution jurisprudence to an end, as cases are now
brought under the much easier to prove “effects” test of Section 2 rather
than the “purpose” test required by the Constitution.186 But as the Court
began to interpret the amended Section 2, its penchant for disorder and
chaos was also likely to arise as well. As seen in the recent LULAC v. Perry187 and Bartlett v. Strickland,188 uncertainty and confusion reign. Put simply, the justices cannot help themselves.
As the unpredictable jurisprudence in this area demonstrates, the Court
has always behaved in an “interregnum-like” manner. It was common for
the individual Justices to express their independent views on representation,
and it was ordinary for opinions to produce unclear results leaving lower
courts to fend for themselves The Court has always behaved this way with
respect to the law of democracy and, as Gerken correctly notes, it continues
to behave this way today.189 In our minds, this should lead us to at least
question the Court’s role in regulating the law of democracy.

III. TAKING STOCK OF THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY
Were the Court’s confused and haphazard approach to questions of
minority vote dilution an isolated occurrence within this difficult area, we
would not be writing this Essay. But the reality is far from that. We could
choose from any sub-field within the law of democracy, from political190 or
racial gerrymandering191 and the equipopulation principle,192 to campaign
184. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
185. Samuel Issacharoff, Polarized Voting and the Political Process: The Transformation of Voting Rights Jurisprudence, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 1833, 1850-53 (1992).
186. See, e.g., United States v. Blaine County, 363 F.3d 897, 900 (9th Cir. 2004)
(bringing challenge under VRA); Cousin v. McWherter 46 F.3d 568, 569 (6th Cir. 1995)
(same); Jones v. City of Lubbock, 727 F.2d 364, 385 (5th Cir. 1984) (upholding § 2 violation
of at-large elections in Lubbock, Texas, but disagreeing with the district court’s decision that
the case violated the Constitution, as there was not adequate proof of purposeful discrimination).
187. 548 U.S. 399 (2006).
188. 129 S.Ct. 1231 (2009).
189. Gerken, Lost, supra note 10, at 505.
190. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004); Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109
(1986).
191. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993); United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S.
144 (1977).
192. See Larios v. Cox, 300 F. Supp. 2d 1320 (N.D. Ga. 2004), aff’d, Cox v. Larios,
542 U.S. 947 (2004).

446

Michigan State Law Review

[Vol. 2009:417

finance193 or the Voting Rights Act.194 Any of these areas make clear that
what we see in the minority-vote-dilution cases is not an exception. The
Court’s handling of the law of democracy does not inspire much confidence.
And so we come to what must be, by all accounts, the crux of the matter: as the Court regulates the political thicket as it does, mindful of neither
consistency nor coherence, it is time to take stock of the field. This final
Part takes up this project. The first section looks back to the debate between
Justices Brennan and Frankfurter over the proper role of the Court in the
field of politics. This is a debate clearly reflected in our present debate over
the Court’s approach to the law of democracy, between the structuralists
and the individualists. Justice Brennan, as we shall see shortly, moved the
Court to adopt the individualist approach, while Justice Frankfurter offered
a structuralist argument against judicial intervention. In looking to this argument, we seek to recapture the context that led the Court to take on these
difficult questions, as well as the obvious complexities that inhere within
the law of democracy. The second section looks to the future and asks
whether the benefits of judicial intervention outweigh the costs.

A. Justice Frankfurter v. Justice Brennan
In Baker v. Carr, the U.S. Supreme Court confronted a question it had
yet to decide in its history: whether the drawing of district lines presented a
justiciable question under then-existing constitutional principles.195 According to those who stood against intervention—a camp that included, most
prominently, Justice Frankfurter—this was a classic political question better
left to the political branches to decide.196 Advocates of intervention understood this question as no different from many other questions the Court already adjudicated, while the problem presented was just as important. Or as
Anthony Lewis wrote in an influential 1957 article in the Harvard Law Review,
The Supreme Court has found special justification for judicial intervention to preserve basic political liberties—of speech, press, assembly. The right to fair repre-

193. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93
(2003); FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 499 (2007).
194. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006); Reno v.
Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320 (2000); Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461 (2003).
195. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
196. See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 552 (1946); Baker, 369 U.S. at 266
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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sentation can be of no less importance. A vacuum exists in our political system;
the federal courts have the power and the duty to fill this vacuum.197

Writing for himself and five other Justices, Justice Brennan swept all
difficulties aside and concluded that these questions fit comfortably within
the Court’s traditional powers.198 None of the questions that troubled other
Justices and commentators through the years proved too complicated for
him. The Court had jurisdiction, the case did not present a non-justiciable
political question, and the lower courts would be able to fashion relief if it
determined on remand that constitutional violations existed.199 This case
was no different from anything else the Court did.200 The fact that his opinion covered sixty-five pages of the U.S. Reports betrayed his confidence.
Or as Justice Clark began his concurring opinion, in reference to the multiple opinions accompanying Justice Brennan’s, “One emerging from the
rash of opinions with their accompanying clashing of views may well find
himself suffering a mental blindness.”201 This was not an easy case, and
Justice Brennan could not wish it so.
One move in particular remains with us and deserves special mention.
In discussing whether plaintiffs had standing to bring forth their claims in
federal court, Justice Brennan concluded as follows, “The injury which appellants assert is that this classification [under review] disfavors the voters
in the counties in which they reside, placing them in a position of constitutionally unjustifiable inequality vis-à-vis voters in irrationally favored counties.”202 The injury in question, according to Justice Brennan, was an injury
to voters as individuals. Let us repeat this point lest the reader miss its importance: in refusing to apportion the state to accommodate changes in population, the state action in question injured voters as individuals. To live in
a malapportioned district was to sustain a constitutionally cognizable injury,
an injury that the federal courts were equipped to handle.
Justice Frankfurter disagreed with every one of these arguments. We
focus on two arguments in particular. On the question of injury, Justice
Frankfurter explained—in our minds correctly—that this was not a case
where plaintiffs were claiming a private injury to their interests.203 To be
sure, that was what they pled, but that was not what this case was about. As
197. Anthony Lewis, Legislative Apportionment and the Federal Courts, 71 HARV. L.
REV. 1057, 1059 (1958).
198. Baker, 369 U.S. at 209-11.
199. Id. at 237.
200. See Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Back to the Beginning: An Essay on the Court, the
Law of Democracy, and Trust, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1045, 1060 (2008) (contending that
the Court understood the issue in Baker as no different from issues it handled across the
spectrum of constitutional law).
201. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 251 (1961) (Clark, J., concurring).
202. Baker, 369 U.S. at 207-08 (majority opinion).
203. See id. at 298-300 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).

448

Michigan State Law Review

[Vol. 2009:417

he wrote, “the discrimination relied on is the deprivation of what appellants
conceive to be their proportionate share of political influence.”204 After all,
he continued, the plaintiffs are able to both exercise their right to vote and to
have their votes counted. And so the plaintiffs’ real objection was to the
state’s adoption of a “basis of representation with which they are dissatisfied.”205 In other words, the plaintiffs were asking the Court to choose a
different basis of representation from what the state had chosen, to impose a
different theory of political philosophy from the one chosen by the state and
its representatives.206 This was the essence of the litigation in Baker v. Carr.
Justice Frankfurter ultimately had the better argument once the early
disparities in representation lessened. At a time when the population disparities were as much as 41 to 1, as seen in the Reynolds litigation, it was easy
to argue that voters in malapportioned districts had what amounted to no
vote at all. The injury was so obvious to the naked eye that the Court could
easily deploy the language of individual rights and get away with it.207 But
once the Court’s intervention had its desired effect, Justice Frankfurter’s
argument gained greater currency. Once the original injury lessened, subsequent judicial intervention required sharper and more fine-tuned distinctions about how we wish to structure our democratic institutions. This is
true of ballot access cases or the regulation of political parties, of political
gerrymandering or the wrongful districting cases. These are cases about
what role the political parties should play in our political system, about the
proper level of political power for persons of color, or the fair way to divide
seats in a legislature.208 These are not issues of individual rights, but the
proper structure of our democratic process.
Justice Frankfurter also disagreed on the question of standards. Recall
that Justice Brennan found this issue simple enough to dismiss with a casual
reference to the “well developed and familiar” standards under the Equal
Protection Clause.209 Dissenters and commentators alike wished for the
Court to delineate specific standards for redistricting cases, but the Court
was content to only go as far as to offer the “arbitrary and capricious” standard.210 This was no answer, according to Justice Frankfurter. His answer
is worth quoting at length:
204. Id. at 299.
205. Id. at 300.
206. See id.
207. See Samuel Issacharoff, Judging Politics: The Elusive Quest for Judicial Review
of Political Fairness, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1643, 1652 (1993).
208. See Gerken, Lost, supra note 10, at 512.
209. Baker, 369 U.S. at 226.
210. See Jerold Israel, On Charting a Course Through the Mathematical Quagmire:
The Future of Baker v. Carr, 61 MICH. L. REV. 107, 130-46 (1962) (quoting Baker, 369 U.S.
at 226); see also Robert G. McCloskey, The Supreme Court, 1961 Term – Foreword: The
Reapportionment Case, 76 HARV. L. REV. 54, 55 (1962) (“[T]he Supreme Court [in Baker]
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Apportionment, by its character, is a subject of extraordinary complexity, involving—even after the fundamental theoretical issues concerning what is to be
represented in a representative legislature have been fought out or compromised—
considerations of geography, demography, electoral convenience, economic and
social cohesions or divergencies among particular local groups, communications,
the practical effects of political institutions like the lobby and the city machine, ancient traditions and ties of settled usage, respect for proven incumbents of long experience and senior status, mathematical mechanics, censuses compiling relevant
data, and a host of others.211

This is clearly right as far as it goes. But as Justice Frankfurter continued, how would a judge evaluate this amalgam of factors under equal
protection principles? Or, in his words, “these are not factors that lend
themselves to evaluations of a nature that are the staple of judicial determinations or for which judges are equipped to adjudicate by legal training or
experience or native wit.”212 And he was surely right about that.
His point bears repeating only because of what came next. As he
wrote about these factors and the impossibility of choosing among them, the
difficulties were all the more challenging “because in every strand of this
complicated, intricate web of values meet the contending forces of partisan
politics.”213 More to the point, matters of this kind involved questions of
pure politics. This was an important point in two ways. First, these were
matters that would ultimately affect future election results. The Court must
interfere with these issues cautiously. Second, these were “overwhelmingly
party or intra-party contests.”214 As the Court decides to enter this terrain, it
must tread only too carefully; for once it begins to take sides in these politically-charged controversies, the line between politics and law begins to
blur.
B. Should the Court Simply Go Away?
The lessons of the debate between Justices Frankfurter and Brennan
are clear. Justice Frankfurter advocated for a cautious approach, an approach respectful of politics and deferential to compromises reached elsewhere. This view recognizes that the Court cannot do all things and must
protect, first and foremost, the one asset it does have: its legitimacy. This is
why Justice Frankfurter focused on the many reasons why the Court should
offered the lower court no standards by which the decision should be reached and no hints
about the remedy that might be appropriate if the plaintiffs prevailed.”); C. Herman Pritchett,
Equal Protection and the Urban Majority, 58 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 869, 871 (1964) (arguing
that Baker “did not indicate what standards the judiciary should apply in passing on complaints about legislative apportionment”).
211. Baker, 369 U.S. at 323 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
212. Id. at 324.
213. Id.
214. Id.
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not intervene when confronted with the refusal by state legislatures to redraw its district lines for many years. In contrast, Justice Brennan took a far
more expansive view of the Court and its powers. This was a view of the
Court as an engine of social change, as a muscular institution that could
solve all problems, large and small. In this way, the redistricting cases were
no different from anything else the Court was willing to do.
Understood this way, both camps were partly right and partly wrong.
Justice Brennan was undoubtedly correct that the Court could handle these
cases and impose its vision of equality upon the states. The states hardly
put up a fight, and the better question at the time was in trying to explain
why the states acquiesced as readily as they did.215 But Justice Frankfurter
was also correct that the Constitution offered the Court no firm guidance for
handling these cases. Making matters worse, he recognized that the law of
democracy was full of complex questions of structure devoid of easy answers. This is why we see the chaos that we do in these cases from the time
of Baker v. Carr. As the Court makes its way through the famed thicket,
and the Justices face these difficult questions, constitutional principle gives
way to idiosyncratic answers to the problems presented. This is true about
the gerrymandering cases, interpretations of campaign finance laws and the
Voting Rights Act, ballot access, and vote dilution cases. Among all the
factors at issue, how is the Court to choose among them?
Looking to the future, the question at the heart of the law of democracy asks us to take sides on this debate. The contemporary answer is clear
enough: most scholars side with Justice Brennan and offer their preferred
theories of choice. The leading accounts argue for judicial adoption of a
“political competition” value216 and the enforcement of core equality
rights.217 Our favorite account offers a theory of “Constitutional pluralism,”
which encourages the Court to “utilize democratic principles to direct its
interpretation of the Constitution.”218 This is a defense of judicial review in
defense of “core democratic principles.”219 These theories all share a common view of the Court as muscular and aggressive.
We do not offer a theory of our own. Instead, our point is that in offering our preferred theories of choice we run directly into the objections
raised by Justice Frankfurter. Professors Pildes and Issacharoff, two of the
leading structuralists of our generation, implicitly concede as much. As
they write,
215. See McCloskey, supra, note 210.
216. See Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics As Markets: Partisan
Lockups of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643 (1998); Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARV. L. REV. 593 (2002).
217. See HASEN, supra note 5, at 79-81.
218. Charles, supra note 73, at 1107.
219. Id.
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[F]or an emerging field seeking to build on the Warren Court’s initial, critical engagement with the deep, structural features of democratic institutions, the central
question is how deep into existing practices a robust, functional, historically-aware
understanding of democracy will penetrate. “Elections” can look legitimate with
full access and fairly counted ballots. But what ideas about social life and political
representation should inform the antecedent and far more decisive questions of
whether elections are conducted through cumulative voting, proportional representation, or the longstanding but hardly examined American tradition of singlemember, winner-take-all elections in geographic districts? Or whether within
democratic bodies, decisions should be reached with minority vetoes, with consociational requirements of concurrent majorities, or with simple majority rule?220

This passage is reminiscent of Justice Frankfurter’s complaint we quoted
earlier about the difficulties that inhere to the task of redistricting.221 The
point then, as it is today, is whether the Court can distinguish among all
these factors, and whether we would want it to.
First, consider the argument by Professors Issacharoff and Pildes that
the Court should enforce a value of political competition. The obvious first
question asks where this value comes from. Its answer is disarmingly simple:
The way to sustain the constitutional values of American democracy is often
through the more indirect strategy of ensuring appropriately competitive interorganizational conditions. It is in this way that central democratic values, such as responsiveness of policy to citizen values and effective citizen voice and participation,
are best realized in mass democracies.222

This is a view of judicial intervention grounded in democratic theory and of
the Justices as democratic engineers. Justices Frankfurter and Harlan responded to this argument in their dissents in Baker; as they argued, this is
nothing short of choosing one argument over another and asking the Court
to choose “among competing theories of political philosophy.”223 In so
doing, this view “reflects more an adventure in judicial experimentation
than a solid piece of judicial adjudication.”224 This is another way of saying
that this view asks the Court to take sides in these controversies in accordance with the Justices’ own preferences about the proper structure of our
government. Recall in this vein the objections raised by Justice Frankfurter
about the myriad values and choices reflected in this area that the Court is
forced to confront. Some Justices might prefer “responsiveness” as the cen-

220. Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Not By “Election Law” Alone, 32 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 1173, 1183 (1999).
221. See supra text accompanying note 211.
222. Richard H. Pildes, The Theory of Political Competition, 85 VA. L. REV. 1605,
1611 (1999).
223. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 300 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
224. Baker, 369 U.S. at 339 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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tral democratic value; yet others might choose political stability instead.225
How is a Court to choose among them?226
To be fair, Issacharoff and Pildes concede that the Court need not be
the one institution that enforces this important value. Yet they conclude that
no other institution is likely to fill this void.227
The argument for enforcement of core equality rights faces similar difficulties. The argument here is that the Court should focus its attention in
protecting core equality rights and leave contested rights to the vagaries of
the political process. As a theoretical matter, the argument can be as persuasive as one wishes it to be, but the details soon get in the way. To the
question of how a Court would decipher what these core equality rights are,
Professor Hasen offers two answers: these are the basic rights essential to a
contemporary democracy,228 or else, looking to the future, these are also the
rights that are the product of “social consensus.”229 We set aside for purposes of this argument his enumeration of these basic essential rights and happily concede that limitations on the right to vote on the basis of “gender,
literacy, national origin, race, religion, sexual orientation” and wealth belong on that list.230 We also agree that states must not place unreasonable
burdens on individuals wishing to organize with others for political purposes. Hasen writes that this is a “small universe” of rights.231
We are more curious about the basis for these rights. Hasen argues
that these rights have been socially constructed; thus, he argues that any
other rights must achieve core status through a similar process of social
consensus.232 The problem then becomes obvious: how is a court to know
when a right achieves social consensus?233 This question is particularly important in light of Hasen’s admission that the history of the Court’s political
equality jurisprudence shows that “there has been no distinction between the
justices’ views of the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause and what the
Constitution requires.”234 Or as he states more forcefully a few sentences
later, “[a]t least in the area of political equality, there is little question that
225. See generally Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 144 (1986) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973).
226. The same point applies to Professor Charles’ model of constitutional pluralism.
See Charles, supra note 73.
227. See Pildes, supra note 220, at 1611; Samuel Issacharoff, Oversight of Regulated
Political Markets, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 91, 97 (2000).
228. See HASEN, supra note 5, at 79-80.
229. Id. at 80-81.
230. Id. at 82.
231. See id. at 79.
232. Id. at 80-81.
233. See Luis E. Fuentes-Rohwer, Of Platonic Guardians, Trust, and Equality: A
Comment on Hasen’s Minimalist Approach to the Law of Elections, 31 J. LEGIS. 25, 32-33
(2004).
234. HASEN, supra note 5, at 158.
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justices of the Warren Court (like the justices of the Burger and Rehnquist
Courts that followed) have ‘made it up’ as they went along.”235 And so, the
question becomes, why should we assume that the notion of social consensus will cabin the Court’s decisionmaking in any noticeable way?
As we discuss these contrasting theories of judicial decision-making in
the law of democracy, we return to Justice Frankfurter one final time. Note
first that both theories wish for the Court to take a limited and limiting approach in this area. Yet, in the end, they return us to the place where Justice
Frankfurter began. How to choose from the many factors from which a
Court must necessarily choose? In light of the history of the Court in this
field, it is hard to trust the Court to regulate this important field. This must
mean, at the very least, that argument for less intervention, or any intervention at all, must at least be taken seriously.
CONCLUSION
The Court’s handling of the law of democracy is not worthy of much
praise. It is haphazard, confused, and messy. Recent scholarship either
tries to explain this messiness and incoherence as a strategy to buy the Court
time until a new and stable majority emerges, or else scholars retrieve the
world they know best, where normativity is the norm and they offer their
judicial theories of choice. We do neither. Rather, we contend that what we
witness today is not new but the way the Court has handled the field of democracy from the moment it intervened in Baker v. Carr. As a result, we
go back to Baker and the debate between Justices Frankfurter and Brennan
over the wisdom of judicial intervention. In our minds, this is a debate with
a clear winner: to this day, Justice Frankfurter’s forceful argument has gone
both unheeded and unanswered. The evidence is in, and so, after forty years
of judicial review in the realm of politics, the question for the future should
be whether judicial intervention in the realm of politics is worth the cost.
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